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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff7Appellee, 
ORRIN BRUCE WALLACE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20040237-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction of assault by a prisoner, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (West 2004), in the Fifth Judicial 
District, Washington County, the Honorable G. Rand Beacham presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction over the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Was trial counsel ineffective for not filing a motion claiming selective prosecution 
based on the prosecutor's decision not to offer a plea bargain? 
"An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal, 
presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25,16, 89 P.3d 162. To prove the 
claim, a "defendant must show: (1) that counsel's performance was objectively deficient, 
and (2) a reasonable probability exists that but for the deficient conduct defendant would 
have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial." Id. (citing State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 
638, 644 (Utah 1996); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with assault by a prisoner. Rl-2. 
Defendant waived his right to a jury trial and requested a trial before the bench. R33. 
On the day of trial, as trial was about to begin, defense counsel indicated that her 
client had prepared a pro se Affidavit for Entry of Selective Prosecution (the "affidavit") 
and had requested that she "present [it] to the Court prior to the case starting" for 
purposes of making "a record for appeal." RDS^. 1 The court indicated that defendant 
was free to file whatever papers he wished, but that if the affidavit was intended as 
evidence in the case, the court would have to determine its admissibility. Id. at 3-4. 
Defense counsel responded, "I advised him that I thought at the end of the case would be 
the time for him to present this if necessary, but again it is something he is doing on his 
own, it's not connected with my representation." Id. at 4. 
1
 The affidavit, R37-39, and defendant's Objections and Trial Brief, R40-58, were 
apparently submitted at the end of trial. RR135:3, 84. The pro se documents alleged that 
the trial prosecutor discriminated against defendant on the basis of race when he did not 
offer defendant a plea bargain. R37-38. Defendant requested that the court require the 
prosecutor to offer defendant "an opportunity to plead to a lesser degree of penalty, i.e., a 
misdemeanor." R38. Thus, the affidavit and trial brief appear to constitute some kind of 
motion that the court consider selective prosecution as a defense to the felony charge. In 
his brief on appeal, defendant argues that, had trial counsel filed the affidavit before trial 
began, the trial court would, at the very least, have treated it as a motion for an 
evidentiary hearing and/or for discovery on his selective prosecution claim. See Br. 
Appellant at 9. 
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Defendant stated in the affidavit that he was "representing himself pro se in the 
[selective prosecution] action without the assistance of counsel." R37. He alleged that 
"[o]ther inmates similarly situated have had the opportunity to plead to a lesser degree" 
and that he "ha[d] not been afforded that same opportunity as the majority of [his] peers 
who happen[ed] to be of . . . races other than African American." R38. In an attachment, 
labeled "Objections and Trial Br[ie]f," defendant alleged that it was "standard practice" 
for the State to settle assault by prisoner cases and that the State had settled "far more 
severe cases." R40. He also alleged that the State had settled a prison assault case with 
Chad White, an inmate who apparently had been involved in another prison assault 
matter. Id. 
Trial was held, and the trial court found defendant guilty. R135:83. Following the 
court's announcement of its verdict, defense counsel reminded the court about 
defendant's affidavit and asked to submit it. Id. at 84. The court agreed to have the clerk 
file it. Id. 
The prosecution objected, arguing that the matter was untimely. Id. The court 
ruled that the affidavit could nonetheless be filed. Id. 
A week after trial, defendant filed a pro se motion for discovery on his selective 
prosecution claim and a pro se motion for an evidentiary hearing on the matter. R60-63. 
He subsequently filed a second pro se Affidavit for Entry of Selective Prosecution, to 
which he attached a memorandum of law. See R63A-G. For the first time in that 
memorandum, he alleged that Chad White was "white." R63 A. For the first time, he 
also alleged that a second inmate, Fred Mitchell, who was an "Indian," had been charged 
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with assault by a prisoner following an unrelated incident and that the State had offered 
Mitchell a plea bargain. R63A-B. 
The court did not address either of defendant's affidavits. See R59-90. At 
sentencing, the court imposed a prison term of zero to five years. R87-90. Defendant 
timely appealed. R91. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant, an inmate, was playing handball in the yard at Purgatory Correctional 
Facility in Washington County. R135:77. The victim, another inmate, said something 
that annoyed defendant. Id, The nature of the victim's comment was unclear. Id, It may 
or may not have been a racial slur. Id, at 78. In any case, the comment was not a threat. 
Id. at 77. 
Defendant "lost it" and slapped or struck the victim on the mouth. Id. at 79. The 
blow cut the inside of the victim's mouth and caused pain. Id. at 79-81. Defendant 
intended to cause the pain and injury. Id. at 81. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's affidavit was insufficient to demonstrate selective prosecution or even 
to support a motion for an evidentiary hearing on the matter. Defendant's only evidence 
was a self-serving affidavit alleging that the State routinely settled prison assault cases, 
that the State had settled cases involving more serious assaults, and that the State had 
settled an unrelated prison assault case involving an inmate named Chad White. 
Because defendant's affidavit was insufficient to entitle him to a ruling that the 
prosecutor had discriminated against him or to an evidentiary hearing on the matter, trial 
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counsel was not deficient for not making a futile motion for a ruling or a hearing. 
Moreover, trial counsel was not deficient for not making the motion at the beginning of 
trial when it would have been impracticable for the court to address the belated request. 
Further, because defendant cannot show that he was entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing, he cannot show prejudice. Based on the evidence in the record, no probability 
existed that he would have succeeded on a motion for an evidentiary hearing or that, 
following a hearing, the prosecutor would have offered him a plea bargain or that, as a 
result, the outcome of this case would have been different. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENSE COUNSEL PROVIDED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
EVEN THOUGH SHE DID NOT TIMELY FILE DEFENDANT'S 
PRO SE MOTION CLAIMING SELECTIVE PROSECUTION; THE 
MOTION WOULD HAVE BEEN FUTILE AND TIME FOR 
TIMELY FILING HAD ALREADY PASSED 
Defendant, an African-American, claims that trial counsel was ineffective for 
"failing to timely file or pursue his motion regarding selective prosecution." Br. 
Appellant at 5. He asserts that his affidavit "shows that his claim is meritorious in that he 
has at least carried his burden to establish selective prosecution." Id. at 4. He claims that 
counsel was deficient because she did not file a motion claiming selective prosecution or 
insure that defendant knew how and when to file the motion. Id. He claims he was 
prejudiced because, had a motion been timely filed, it is likely that "an evidentiary 
hearing . . . would have been held," that, following the hearing, "the prosecution would 
have offered [him] a plea," and that he, therefore, "would have received a more favorable 
outcome." Id. at 5, 9. 
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Thus, defendant's ineffective assistance claim is predicated on a claim that he was 
selectively prosecuted for assault by a prisoner. That claim, in turn, is supported only by 
his personal affidavits. Id. at 7. 
A. Defendant's claim is inadequately briefed. 
This Court should reject defendant's claim. Defendant has inadequately briefed 
his selective prosecution claim, pointing to no legal precedent for finding "selective 
prosecution" based upon a prosecutor's decision not to offer a plea bargain. See Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(9) (stating that the brief "shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented,. . . with citations to the authorities, 
statutes, and parts of the record relied on"). Even assuming that a decision with respect 
to plea bargaining could serve as the predicate for a "selective prosecution" challenge, 
defendant has not analyzed the facts of this case in light of the law to show why his claim 
has merit. Thus, he has inadequately briefed his claim, and this Court should decline to 
address it. See id; see also State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) ("[A] 
reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited 
and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of 
argument and research.") (citing Williamson v. Opsahl, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (111. App. 
1981)). 
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B. Defendant has not demonstrated selective prosecution: he has shown no 
evidence that "(1) that other violators who are similarly situated are generally 
not prosecuted; (2) that the selection of the claimant was 'intentional or 
purposeful'; and (3) that the selection was pursuant to an 'arbitrary 
classification.'" 
Even if this Court were to excuse defendant's failure to adequately brief his claim, 
defendant could not prevail. Defendant has not established a prima facie case of selective 
prosecution. He has not even made a preliminary showing sufficient to entitle him to an 
evidentiary hearing on the matter. Moreover, even had trial counsel filed the motion just 
before trial proceeded, it would still have been too late. The trial court could hardly have 
been expected to rule on the motion without an evidentiary hearing. A hearing on the 
morning of trial, before trial, would not have been practicable. 
The administration of the law "so as practically to make unjust and illegal 
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances" has long been held to 
constitute "the denial of equal justice." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886). 
Discriminatory prosecution claims, however, have seldom succeeded. 4 WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.4(a), at 44 (2d ed. 1999) & cases cited 
therein. "[C]ourts 'have found only a handful of equal protection violations' arising out 
of the charging decisions of prosecutors." Id. (citing Gifford, Equal Protection and the 
Prosecutor's Charging Decision: Enforcing an Ideal, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 659, 662 
(1981)). "This is because claimants bear a 'heavy burden' to overcome the presumption 
of legal regularity in enforcement of the penal law." Id. A claimant must show "(1) that 
other violators who are similarly situated are generally not prosecuted; (2) that the 
selection of the claimant was 'intentional or purposeful'; and (3) that the selection was 
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pursuant to an 'arbitrary classification.5" Id. at 45 (citations omitted); see also State v. 
Horde, 2002 UT 4, \ 29, 57 P.3d 977, 986; State v. Geer, 765 P.2d 1, 3-4 (Utah App. 
1988). 
Because it is presumed that criminal prosecutions are undertaken in good faith, a 
"defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating selective enforcement." LAFAVE, 
§ 13.4(b), at 46. Courts have described this initial burden of proof in various ways. See 
id. (citing People v. Utica Daw }s Drug Co, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128, 134 (N.Y. 1962) ("a clear 
preponderance of the proof); Commonwealth v. Franklin, 385 N.E.2d 227, 233 (Mass. 
1978) ("a reasonable inference of impermissible discrimination"); United States v. Falk, 
479 F.2d 616, 623 (7th Cir. 1973) (a "prima facie case"); United States v. Berrigan, 482 
F.2d 171, 179 (3d Cir. 1973) ("convincing evidence")). The burden exists with respect to 
each of the three elements of the claim. Id. "[T]hus the defendant 'must show that a 
broader class of persons than those prosecuted has violated the law,. . . that failure to 
prosecute was either consistent or deliberate,. . . and that the decision not to prosecute 
was based on an impermissible classification such as race.'" Id. (citing Franklin, 385 
N.E.2d at 233-34); see also Honie, 2002 UT 4, at ^ 29; Geer, 765 P.2d at 3-4. 
A defendant's "more immediate hurdle . . . is to make a sufficient showing" with 
respect to each element "to require that an evidentiary hearing be held" or that discovery 
be ordered. Id; see also United States v. James, 257 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 2001). 
What constitutes this "threshold showing" is articulated in various ways. LAFAVE, 
§ 13.4(b), at 46. A "defendant may be required to allege facts sufficient to raise a 
reasonable doubt about the prosecutor's purpose." Id. (citing United States v. Cyprian, 
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23 F.3d 1189, 1195 (7m Cir. 1994)). He may be required "to take the question past the 
frivolous state,9' United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864, 866 (8th Cir. 1978), or to establish 
"a colorable" basis for his claim, United States v. Torquato, 602 F.2d 564, 570 (3d Cir. 
1979), or even to show "a prima facie case," United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 
1308 (5th Cir. 1978). See LAFAVE, § 13.4(b), at 46. A defendant is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing only if he makes this threshold showing. Id. Thus, a defendant is 
required to make at least some credible showing. 
Moreover, "given the heavy burden that discovery can impose on the 
government,... the showing necessary to obtain discovery [to prepare for an evidentiary 
hearing on a claim of selective prosecution] must 'itself be a significant barrier to the 
litigation of insubstantial claims.'" James, 257 F.3d at 1178 (quoting United States v. 
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464, 468 (1996)). To obtain discovery to support a motion for 
an evidentiary hearing, "a defendant must first produce 'some evidence tending to show 
the existence of the essential elements of the defense,' that is, both discriminatory intent 
and discriminatory effect. Because of the latter element, [the] required threshold includes 
'a credible showing of different treatment of similarly situated persons.'" LAFAVE, 
§ 13.4(b), at 50 (quoting Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 468, 470). If an evidentiary hearing is 
held, defendant then "has the burden of going forward with the evidence at the 
evidentiary hearing." Id. at 47. 
Defendant has not made a sufficient showing with respect to each element to 
support a motion for an evidentiary hearing or even a motion that discovery be ordered. 
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1. Defendant has made no showing that others similarly situated are generally 
not prosecuted for similar conduct or that they are generally offered plea 
bargains. 
Defendant's unilateral allegations that he was not given the same treatment as 
other prisoners involved in assaults while in custody are, of themselves, insufficient. 
Self-serving and conclusory statements, even if made by way of affidavit, are insufficient 
to show selective prosecution or even to support a motion for an evidentiary hearing on 
the matter. Cf David v. United States, 134 F.3d 470 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding defendant's 
unsupported allegation that counsel failed to communicate a plea offer insufficient to 
support motion for evidentiary hearing); United States v. Curry, 497 F.2d 99, 100-101 
(5th Cir. 1974) (holding defendant's self-serving affidavit that testifying co-defendant was 
promised a lenient sentence insufficient to necessitate evidentiary hearing); 
Commonwealth v. Denis, 814 N.E.2d 1080, 1094 (Mass. 2004) (stating that trial judge 
did not abuse his discretion by refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing on allegation of 
police wrongdoing supported only by defendant's self-serving affidavit). 
Moreover, even if defendant's self-serving statements are assumed to be true, they 
are insufficient to meet his initial burden to make a "credible showing" of different 
treatment of similar situated persons. Defendant's original affidavit, the one presented at 
trial, merely alleges that other similarly situated inmates were given plea bargains. That 
affidavit references a single case where an inmate named Chad White, whose race is not 
indicated, was offered a plea bargain following a prison assault. R40. Even in his second 
affidavit, made following trial, defendant makes only two specific allegations: (1) that 
Chad White, a white inmate involved in an unrelated incident, was charged with assault 
10 
by a prisoner, Dut allowed to enter a plea bargain, and (2) that Fred Mitchell, a Native 
American inmate involved in a third incident, was also charged with assault by a 
prisoner, but allowed to enter a plea bargain. R63A-B. 
Defendant must show that others who were similarly situated were treated 
differently. That all three inmates were charged with the same crime suggests that they 
were treated similarly. Thus, defendant has not shown "other violators who are similarly 
situated are generally not prosecuted." LAFAVE, § 13.4(a), at 45. 
Moreover, to the extent defendant alleges that he was treated differently from the 
two other inmates with respect to plea negotiations, he has not shown that he was 
"similarly situated." "'Defendants are similarly situated when their circumstances 
present no distinguishable legitimate prosecutorial factors that might justify making 
different decisions with respect to them.'" U.S. v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 566 (E.D. 
Va. 2002) (quoting United States v. Olvis, 97 F.3d 739, 744 (4th Cir. 1996)). The record 
reflects little about the circumstances surrounding defendant's crime and nothing about 
the circumstances surrounding the other two crimes. The other two inmates may have 
been more frequently or more severely provoked than defendant. This may have been a 
first assault by the other two and one in a long series of assaults by defendant. 
Defendant's pre-incarceration criminal history may have included more frequent or more 
serious violent acts than the histories of the other two inmates. The evidence against 
defendant may have been stronger than the evidence against the other two. The other 
inmates may have agreed to testify as part of their plea bargains. 
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Having failed to show any evidence that either or both of the inmates offered plea 
bargains were "similarly situated," defendant has not made a prima facie case or even a 
preliminary showing that other violators who were similarly situated were treated 
differently. Therefore, contrary to his claim, he has not established a prima facie case of 
"selective prosecution," nor has he shown that, had he filed a motion for an evidentiary 
hearing, the trial court should or would have granted it. 
2. Defendant has not established intentional or purposeful discrimination on the 
basis of race. 
Defendant's specific allegations, even if true, would show only that one white 
inmate was offered a plea bargain, that one Native American inmate was offered a plea 
bargain, and that one African-American inmate—defendant—was not offered a plea 
bargain. They would not, absent additional evidence, establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination on the basis of race. Defendant has pointed to no evidence suggesting that 
he was not offered a plea bargain because of his race. He has not provided any statistical 
evidence suggesting a pattern of discrimination against African-Americans as a group nor 
has he pointed to any evidence suggesting that the prosecution's decision not to offer a 
plea bargain was part of a pattern of discrimination against him. 
C. Defendant has not shown that counsel's performance fell below an objective 
standard or that counsel's deficient performance affected the outcome of the 
case. 
"With respect to any ineffectiveness claim, a defendant must first demonstrate that 
counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 19, 12 P.3d 92 
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(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88). "Second, the defendant must show that counsel's 
deficient performance was prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." Id. 
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88). "The first prong of the Strickland standard 
further requires that a defendant rebut the strong presumption that 'under the 
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Id. 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689) (additional quotation and citation omitted). 
Defense counsel does not perform deficiently by not "mak[ing] motions or objections 
which would be futile if raised." State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 976 (Utah App. 1998) 
(quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 525 (Utah 1994)). 
Moreover, "where, on direct appeal, defendant raises a claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective . . . defendant bears the burden of assuring the record is adequate." 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, at Tf 16. "The necessary consequence of this burden is that an 
appellate court will presume that any argument of ineffectiveness presented to it is 
supported by all the relevant evidence of which defendant is aware." Id. at f 17. "Where 
the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting 
therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed 
effectively." Id. 
As explained in section B, above, defendant has presented no evidence to support 
a finding that the prosecutor's decision not to offer a plea bargain was based on 
defendant's race. He has not even made a sufficient showing to demonstrate that he was 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim. Moreover, he has not shown that he made 
his claims known to counsel at a time when she could have filed a timely motion. 
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Defendant therefore has not shown that trial counsel performed deficiently when 
she did not move for an evidentiary hearing on the matter just before trial was to begin. 
Nothing in the record suggests that counsel knew anything at all about defendant's 
selective prosecution claim before she arrived at the courthouse for trial and defendant 
gave her his affidavit. See 135:3-4. Even after she had seen defendant's affidavit, all she 
could have known was that one other inmate had committed assault by a prisoner and had 
been offered a plea bargain. See R37-58. Based on that information, any motion for an 
evidentiary hearing or any attempt to demonstrate prosecutorial discrimination would 
have been futile. Counsel does not perform deficiently when she does not file futile or 
frivolous motions. Gallegos, 967 P.2d at 976. She does not perform deficiently when 
she does not facilitate defendant's attempts to make pro se filings of such motions. 
Moreover, counsel does not perform deficiently by not filing a tardy objection to 
proceedings, based on a claim of selective prosecution, on the morning of trial at a time 
when a hearing on the motion is impracticable. 
Finally, the record indicates only that defendant wanted trial counsel to file the 
motion so that it would be part of the record on appeal. R135:3. Trial counsel did that. 
Id. at 84. Under the circumstances, her performance was not deficient. She complied 
with defendant's requests, but did not, upon her own initiative, interrupt trial for a 
discussion of the merits of a clearly insufficient claim at a juncture where all that could 
be accomplished was delay. 
Moreover, because defendant has not demonstrated selective prosecution nor 
shown that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, he has not shown that counsel's not 
14 
filing a request for a ruling or a hearing prejudiced him. Based on the evidence in the 
record, defendant has shown no probability that he would have succeeded on a motion for 
a ruling that the prosecutor had discriminated against him or on a motion for an 
evidentiary hearing. He has shown no probability that, following a hearing, the 
prosecutor would have offered him a plea bargain or that, as a result, the outcome of this 
case would have been different. 
Thus, defendant has not shown that trial counsel was ineffective. He has shown 
neither deficient performance nor prejudice based on a claim that defense counsel should 
have filed his affidavit before trial began. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ ^ day of h^httAJk** , 2004. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
raANNE B. INOtJYE ^ u 
sistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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